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ARGUMENT

I.

THIS IS NOT A WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASE
INVOLVING A NO-FAULT, ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM FOR
BENEFITS.
As

the

defendant

acknowledged

1n

her

brief,

workers'

compensation cases and negligence cases are fundamentally different.
They have different purposes, are brought through different avenues,
seek different remedies, and have different analyses to determine
compensation.
A. Workers' Compensation Cases
As the Court is well aware, workers compensation cases are nofault, administrative claims brought before an administrative law judge
to determine eligibility for workers' compensation benefits. These
claims are brought through the injured party's employer when the party
was injured in the course and scope of employment at the time of the
injury. See UTAH CODE ANN. §34A-2-401. As the Utah Supreme Court
has clearly stated, the Workers' Compensation Act "should be liberally
construed and applied to provide coverage. Any doubt respecting the
right of compensation will be resolved in favor of the injured employee."

State Tax Comm'n v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053

1''-,

\i:i,J

(Utah 1984). The evident policy behind the Act's liberal access to
benefits is to protect Utah workers.
For example, say employee "A" is at the office after hours drafting
an appellate reply brief when one of "A's" co-workers, "B", comes into
the office to watch a basketball game because his cable is out at his
home. Both employees draw paychecks from the same employer, but
"B" has no other purpose at the office that night other than to watch the
basketball game. As "A" is walking from the mail room to his office, "B"
comes running down the hall in celebration of his team's game-winning
buzzer-beater and knocks "A" to the ground, injuring him.
In this example, a workers' compensation case would be when "A"
makes his no-fault, administrative claim for benefits under his
employer's workers' compensation policy. As stated above, the claim
will center upon "A's" status and whether or not he was in the course
and scope of employment at the time of his injury.
B. Negligence Cases
In stark contrast to the no-fault, administrative claims for
workers' compensation benefits in a workers' compensation case, a
third-party negligence claim is an adversarial claim that an individual
2

brings against another party for a negligent act that causes injury to
the claimant.
Using the facts in the example above, if employee "A" was to bring
an adversarial claim against employee "B" for injuries resulting from
"B's" negligent acts outside the course and scope of "B's" employment,
that would be a third-party negligence claim. In contrast to the
workers' compensation analysis to determine eligibility for benefits
that focuses on the injured party's status, the analysis in a third-party
action against "B" centers upon the status of "B", the defendant, and
whether or not he was acting within the course and scope of
employment at the time of the injury. See Utah Home Fire Ins. Co. v.

Manning, 1999 UT 77, 985 P.2d 243 (looking to the defendant's
employment status to determine course and scope of employment).
Stated

differently,

the

test

for

liability

in

the

workers'

compensation arena does not deal with the relation of an individual's
fault or negligence to an event; instead, the test centers upon the
relationship of an event to the employment. The leading treatise on
workers' compensation law contrasts workers' compensation cases from
negligence cases, stating that, "[t]ort litigation is an adversary contest

3

to right a wrong between the contestants; workers' compensation is a
system, not a contest, to supply security to injured workers and
distribute the cost to the consumers of the product." Arthur Larson &
Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law§ 1.03 (2015).

C. This is a Third-Party Negligence Case.
The case before the Court is an adversary contest to right a wrong
between contestants. See Appellant's Brief at§ I. The plaintiff does not
seek workers' compensation benefits; she seeks recourse from a thirdparty who was acting outside the course and scope of employment. The
purpose of this action and appeal is not to determine access to workers'
compensation benefits; it is to seek recourse for a wrong committed
between individuals.

II.

TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF'S THIRDPARTY NEGLIGENCE CLAIM IS PROPER, WE MUST
DETERMINE IF THE DEFENDANT WAS AN EMPLOYEE
IN THE COURSE AND SCOPE.
To determine whether a third-party negligence claim is barred by

the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act,
Utah law dictates that we look to whether the defendant was in the
course and scope of employment. See Manning, 1999 UT 77, 985 P.2d
243; Colvin v. Giguere, 2014 UT 23, 330 P.3d 83, 87. Larson's Workers'
4

Compensation Law agrees with this analysis, plainly stating that "[i]t
must be observed that the immunity attaches to the coemployee only
when the coemployee is acting in the course of employment." Arthur
Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law §
111.03[3] (2015)(citing cases from 30 states)(emphasis added).
The purpose of this appeal is to determine the propriety of the
plaintiffs third-party claim against the defendant. To make such a
determination, we must answer the question, "Is the defendant a thirdparty against whom the plaintiff can properly maintain a negligence
claim?" To answer that question, we must first ask, "Was the defendant
an employee in the course and scope at the time of the injury?" If the
answer is "yes", the workers' compensation exclusive remedy provision
applies and the defendant is protected from suit. If the answer is "no",
the plaintiff may properly bring a negligence action against the
defendant and the exclusive remedy provision does not apply.
It is only after analyzing the course and scope of the defendant
that we can determine whether the Workers' Compensation Act would
apply to this case.

5

A. Course and Scope Questions Must be Left to a Jury.
Utah courts have made it abundantly clear that questions of
course and scope of employment are inherently questions of fact that
must be left to a jury. Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2003 UT 4, 73
P.3d 315, 317. The Supreme Court asserted that "[t]he scope of
employment issue must be submitted to a jury 'whenever reasonable
minds may differ as to whether the [employee] was at a certain time
involved wholly or partly in the performance of his [employer's]
business or within the scope of employment." Clover v. Snowbird, 808
P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah 1991)(quoting Carter v. Bessey, 97 Utah 427, 93
P.2d 490, 493 (1939)).

III. THE DEFENDANT URGES THE COURT TO MISAPPLY A
TEST USED TO DETERMINE ELIGIBILITY FOR
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS.
As stated above, the Workers' Compensation Act and its
corresponding tests are directed at providing liberal access to benefits
for injured workers. However, the plaintiff in this case does not seek
workers' compensation benefits through her employer. She seeks
recourse from the defendant for the defendant's negligent act outside
the course and scope of the defendant's employment. Yet, Defendant

6

asks the Court to misapply a test that was designed to answer the
question: "Is the injured party entitled to workers' compensation
benefits?", as the Hope court erroneously did 28 years ago. 1
Both the plaintiff and the defendant have cited the Supreme
Court's promptings to keep the rules governing scope of employment in
workers' compensation cases and negligence cases separate from one
another:
With very different presumptions governing workers'
compensation and negligence cases, it would not be wise to
hold that rules governing scope of employment questions in
one area are wholly applicable to the other because the legal
effect of identical facts may be different in a negligence case
than in a workers' compensation case.

Ahlstrom, 73 P .3d at fn.1.

Even though the workers' compensation

rules to determine scope of employment were created for the specific
purpose of determining eligibility for workers' compensation benefits,
the defendant now asks this court to stick a square peg in a round hole
by applying a benefit eligibility test to determine course and scope in
the negligence context.

See Brief of Appellant at§ I (discussing the Hope court's
misapplication of the workers' compensation "premises rule" into a
third-party negligence claim even though it had never been adopted as
Utah law and had never been applied to a negligence claim).
1

7

A. Applying the Premises Rule to Negligence Cases will
Create Employer Liability for Employee Actions that
Fall Outside the Course and Scope of Employment.
The defendant cites the "bright-line" premises rule discussed in

Soldier Creek as establishing blanket application in all contextsworkers' compensation cases and negligence cases. Soldier Creek v.

Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165 (Utah 1985). However, the cases the defendant
cites from the "overwhelming majority of states" adopting the rule fall
squarely within the context of determining eligibility for workers'
compensation benefits-the context where the premises rule was
created and where it belongs. See Brief of Appellee at 11.
If the Court were to accept the defendant's invitation to adopt
universal application of the workers' compensation premises rule-once
again, a test created to determine eligibility for workers' compensation
benefits under a no-fault administrative system-in negligence cases
without any question as to course and scope, it would make employers
liable for injuries caused outside the course and scope of employment.
Using the example discussed above between employees "A" and
"B", even though "B" was not operating within the course and scope of
employment when he went running down the hall in celebration on his

8
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team's victory, blanket application of the premises rule would make the
employer liable for any injuries sustained by "A", who was in the course
and scope of employment, and any injuries sustained by "B", who was

not in the course and scope of employment.
Taking this automatic application of the premises rule a little
further, suppose employee "B" had just entered his employer's parking
lot before his shift on a snowy morning when he decides to do a few
donuts in his car. When "B" crashes into "A", who is also on his way to
work for the same employer, the employer will be held liable for both
parties' injuries, without even asking a single question about course and
scope.
Finally, assume "B" is shooting clay pigeons 1n his employer's
parking lot on his day off when he trips and accidentally shoots "A" who
is walking out to his car after his shift. The defendant in this case
would likely argue, as she did in her brief, that "an employee who is
injured by a co-employee on their employer's premises may not file a
third-party negligence claim against her co-employee". See Brief of
Appellee at 5. If Utah courts are to apply the "bright line" premises rule
to all cases, as the defendant argues they should-by simply asking if a

9

person who draws paychecks from an employer is on that employer's
premises-"B" will immediately be determined to be in the course and
scope of employment. As a result, the employer would be liable for the
injuries of both parties, and "B" would be immune from suit under the
workers' compensation exclusivity provision.

It is difficult to imagine that such unfettered application of the
premises rule would be in line with the intended purpose of the
exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act.

B. Applying the Premises Rule to Negligence Cases will
Eliminate Employers' Right of Subrogation for Injuries
Caused Outside the Employer's Control.
Absent a compelling policy reason to the contrary, creators of risk
are legally responsible for the risks they create. B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v.
West, 2012 UT 11,

il 21, 275 P.3d 228, 234. Litigants in the state of

Utah are only responsible for their share, or proportion, of fault. UTAH
CODE

ANN.

§ 78B-5-818(2). This statute is the reflection of clearly

stated public policy set by the legislature.
The facts presented by this case do not invoke the policy
considerations behind the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers'
Compensation Act.

If the employer fails to provide the required
10

benefits to an injured employee, the liability for those injuries is
restored with key defenses waived as a matter of law. Employers pay
for limited liability by agreeing to cover injuries on the job regardless of
fault. This is a bargained and paid for limitation of liability. There is
no compelling policy reason to extend limited liability to a tortfeasor
who has not paid for such a limitation, and who confers no benefit to the
employer while creating risks of harm to others.
In this case, the defendant seeks immunity from all claims arising
from the plaintiffs injury, whether legal or equitable, when she was not
subject to the control of her employer, nor furthering her employer's
business at the time of the plaintiffs injury.
Anytime an employee on the clock for an employer sustains injury,
the employer likewise suffers a loss, as the employer has a
responsibility-whether directly or through insurance-to compensate
the injured employee. Regardless of fault, the employer is compelled by
the Worker's Compensation Act to unconditionally provide benefits to
the injured-on-the-job employee. If the injured employee is successful
in obtaining a recovery against the liable third party, the employer, or
the employer's worker's compensation carrier, has a high-priority

11

statutory right of subrogation. This right of subrogation exists in order
to appropriately, justly and fairly allocate the risk back to its
creator. As insurance premiums are set based on the scope and extent
of risks covered, insurance companies must be allowed to reallocate
risks not created by their insured.
If the trial court's ruling is allowed to stand, the employer and its
insurance carrier are stuck holding the bill to cover liabilities it did not
create. In such a circumstance, an innocent employer is powerless to
mitigate or avoid the loss because the tortfeasor was not subject to its
control when the accident occurred, yet the employer is stuck holding
the bill all the same. If a recovery is denied to the employee, likewise a
recovery will also be denied to an otherwise innocent employer.

C. The Analysis for Course and Scope to Determine an
Employer's Liability is the same for Claims between
Coemployees and Claims of Respondeat Superior.
The defendant has taken issue with the fact that the cases
Plaintiff cites, which address course and scope in the negligence setting,
come in the context of respondeat superior. The defendant argues that
the opinions do not apply because the plaintiffs in those cases have no
potential workers' compensation claims. However,
12

to determine

application of the exclusive remedy prov1s1on, whether between
coemployees or in the context of respondeat superior, the analysis is the
same. If the negligent party is determined to be an employee in the
course and scope, the negligent party's employer is liable in both
contexts.

If the employer is found liable for an injury between

coemployees, the plaintiff is restricted to the exclusive remedy under
the Workers' Compensation Act. If the employer of the negligent party
is found liable in the respondeat superior context, the plaintiff may
recover from the negligent party's employer in the form of money
damages.
Although the source of compensation varies depending on whether
or not the parties are co-workers, the analysis by which we determine
an employer's liability, through course and scope of employment, is the
same.

IV.

BY CALLING THIS A WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASE
AND APPLYING A WORKERS' COMPENSATION TEST,
DEFENDANT SKIPS THE COURSE AND SCOPE
ANALYSIS AND ASSUMES DEFENDANT'S STATUS.
As this case is a suit for negligence between the plaintiff and

defendant, Plaintiff has urged this court to apply the Birkner test that
was established in the negligence arena for the purpose of determining
13

course and scope of employment in the context of a negligence claim.
Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989).

The defendant, on the other hand, asks the Court to apply a
workers' compensation test designed to determine eligibility for
benefits, as explained above.

Yet despite the defendant's insistence

that the Court analyze this case under the Workers' Compensation Act,
the defendant, herself, does not even ask the necessary course and scope
questions under the Act.
If we were to analyze course and scope of employment under the
Workers' Compensation Act as the defendant argues we should, we
would still have to look to the statutory definition of "employee" under
the Act, which defines "employee" as "a person in the service of any
employer ... under any contract of hire." UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2104(1)(b)(emphasis added). Thus, even analyzing course and scope
under the Workers' Compensation Act, we would still have to analyze
whether or not the defendant was in the service of her employer at the
time of the accident.
Rather than conduct any such course and scope analysis under the
Act, and rather than analyzing the facts under the test already provided

14

r.
~

by the Supreme Court for negligence course and scope questions in

Birkner, the defendant simply assumed her own employment status
based on the fact that the plaintiff and defendant both drew paychecks
from the IRS and ended the course and scope analysis there.
As stated above, "immunity attaches to the coemployee only when
the coemployee is acting in the course of employment." Arthur Larson &
Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law§ 111.03[3] (2015).
By assuming the defendant's employment status and not asking the
necessary course and scope questions, Defendant has arbitrarily placed
this case in the workers' compensation box and conducted her entire
analysis and entrenched her entire argument within that box.
Never did the defendant conduct any analysis as to service to the
employer, control of the employer over the defendant, control of the
employer over the parking lot, benefit to the employer, hours of
employment, spatial boundaries of employment, or whether Defendant
was on the premises for another purpose.
The central problem with the defendant's argument is that it begs
the question by using its assumed conclusion-that the defendant was
an employee-as its premise. The defendant's line of reasoning cycles as
15

follows: Because the defendant 1s an employee, this is a workers'
compensation case . Because this 1s a workers' compensation case, we
must use a workers' compensation test to determine course and scope of
employment (the pre1nises rule). Under the workers' compensation test
to determine course and scope of employment (the premises rule), the
defendant was an employee.

Defendant was an employee.

Under the workers' compensation
test for course and scope (the
premises rule), Defendant was an
employee.

Because Defendant was an
employee, this is a workers'
compensation case.

Because this is a workers'
compensation case we must apply
the workers' compensation test for
course and scope (the premises
rule).

Figure 1 - Defendant's Circular Argument
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It is within this circle of logic that the defendant bases her entire
argument, not once looking to the gatekeeper question to determine if
the Workers' Compensation Act even applies: "Was the defendant an
employee in the course and scope of employment at the time of the
accident?"

V.

SUBSEQUENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS HAVE
ERODED THE HOPE DECISION'S FOUNDATION.
The Hope court explained its reasoning when it held that the

plaintiff in Hope was only entitled to workers' compensation benefits:
We decline to follow those jurisdictions which allow plaintiff
recovery from both workers' compensation and from a fellow
employee who might have caused the plaintiffs injury. Such
a result necessitates finding that plaintiff was in the course of
her employment for the purposes of workers' compensation
and that defendant was in some other status.
Hope v. Berrett, 756 P.2d 102, 103 fn. 2 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(emphasis added).

Based on the principle that a plaintiff and a defendant could not have
different employment statuses, the Hope court refused to allow the
defendant to have any status that was different from the Plaintiffs.
Not only does this reasoning depart from the analytical method
employed by the Supreme Court to determine course and scope, but it is
in direct conflict with subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
17

A. The Hope Court's Reasoning Departs from the Supreme
Court's Analytical Method for Determining Course and
Scope.
Based on the reasoning quoted above, it is clear that the Hope
court's decision focused on the employment status of the Plaintiff to
determine course and scope and the applicability of the workers'
compensation exclusivity provision. This flies directly in the face of the
Supreme Court's method of analysis for determining course and scope of
employment in such actions between potential co-workers.
As outlined in Section II, above, the Utah Supreme Court looks to
the defendant's status at the time of the injury to determine whether a
third-party negligence claim is barred by the exclusive remedy
provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. See Manning, 1999 UT
77, 985 P.2d 243; Colvin, 2014 UT 23, 330 P.3d 83. In interpreting the

Manning decision, Defendant correctly noted in her brief that "[t]he
propriety of a negligence action against [the defendant] centered on
whether he was considered an 'employee' under the Act." See Brief of
Appellee at 17; see also Manning, 1999 UT 77, 985 P.2d 243. This falls
directly in line with Professor Larson's point quoted above that
"immunity attaches to the coemployee only when the coemployee is
18

acting in the course of employment." Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson,

Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 111.03[3] (2015)(emphasis
added).
However, the defendant makes the argument that if the plaintiff
collected workers' compensation benefits, it would somehow establish
the defendant's status as an "employee" for purposes of Plaintiffs thirdparty negligence claim without even looking to the defendant at all. See
Brief of Appellee at 14-16.
If this were the correct analytical method, the Supreme Court
would have ended its analysis in Manning in the fourth paragraph of
the opinion where the court states that "Manning received workers'
compensation benefits". 1999 UT 77,

~

4, 985 P.2d 243, 245. At that

point, Defendant's proposed course and scope analysis would be
complete. But the Manning court did not end its analysis there. The
court went on to analyze whether or not the defendant was in the
course and scope of employment to determine whether the exclusive
remedy provision applied. Id.

19

B. The Hope Court's Reasoning Directly Conflicts with
Subsequent Supreme Court Decisions.
As quoted above, the Hope court's holding turned on its refusal to
allow the plaintiff to be in the course of employment for purposes of
workers' compensation and have the defendant be in some other status.
756 P.2d at 103 fn. 2. Such a notion may have been inconceivable in 1988

when Hope was decided, but that had clearly changed by 1999, when
the Supreme Court decided Manning.
As illustrated in the preceding subsection, the Supreme Court was
well aware that the plaintiff had already been considered an employee
for purposes of workers' compensation benefits when it acknowledged
that "Manning received workers' compensation benefits". 1999 UT 77,

,r

4, 985 P.2d at 245. The fact that the court did not immediately and

arbitrarily give the same employment status to the defendant 1s
evidence that the analysis does not stop with the plaintiffs status. It
shows that it was very much a possibility that the plaintiff was in the
course of employment for workers' compensation purposes and that the
defendant was in some other status. Id.
Taking it even further, in Ahlstrom, the Supreme Court found
that the defendant was not in the course and scope of employment
20
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when the defendant, an off-duty police officer, negligently injured
another party in a motor-vehicle accident. Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City,
2003 UT 4, 73 P.3d 315. Yet nearly four years later, the same court
attributed the status of employee in the course and scope for purposes
of obtaining workers' compensation benefits to the same defendant in
the same accident. Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor Comm 'n, 2007 UT 4, 153
P.3d 179. More than just allowing a plaintiff and defendant to have

different statuses within the same event, the Supreme Court allowed a

single individual to have different statuses within the same event.

Id.
The court then explained that application of the going and coming
rule to a single event may result in treating an individual as an
employee for purposes of determining eligibility for benefits, while
withholding employee status for purposes of a negligence claim. Id. at
180-181.

Thus, the Hope court's reluctance to allow different employment
statuses to the plaintiff and the defendant for the same event has
clearly been made obsolete by the Supreme Court's subsequent
decisions.
21

CONCLUSION
The very foundation upon which the Hope decision was
established has eroded through subsequent Utah Supreme Court
decisions. Because the trial court based its decision entirely upon Hope
and misapplied a test designed to determine eligibility for workers'
compensation benefits into this third-party negligence claim, Plaintiff
asks the Court to remand this case to the district court with orders that
a jury make the necessary findings of fact as to whether the defendant
was acting within the course and scope of employment under the

Birkner third-party negligence test.
Dated ,his 8 th day of July, 2016

ford DeBry
Zachary E. Lambert
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOC.
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